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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted in public economics that empirical work on the role of
corporate taxation for the production and investment decisions of multinational
firms should rely on a broader set of tax components rather than only on statu-
tory corporate tax rates.1 In this vein, an important strand of the literature
recommends forward-looking effective (marginal and average) tax rates (hence-
forth, EMTR and EATR) as suitable measures of the corporate tax burden (see
Devereux and Griffith, 2002, 2003).
Based on this literature, this paper uses EMTR and EATR to estimate
the impact of corporate taxes on outbound foreign direct investment (FDI)
within the OECD. In contrast to previous research, we argue that it is decisive
to account for both the unilateral (parent- and host country-specific) and the
bilateral (country-pair-specific) components of effective tax rates. This is moti-
vated by the observation that bilateral tax treaties among the OECD countries
are the rule rather than the exception. Also, bilateral effective tax rates ac-
count for additional financing opportunities of a multinational enterprise which
are not available to a national firm.2 Then, the question arises whether the
omission the (time-variant) country-pair-specific variation in effective tax rates
leads to biased estimates of the impact of corporate taxation on FDI.
We follow the conceptual framework of Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003)
in computing bilateral forward-looking EMTR and EATR for the OECD
economies at the annual level between 1991 and 2002. This entails screen-
ing all national and supranational tax codes, most importantly the tax law of
the European Union and bilateral tax treaties in place. Overall, the sample in-
cludes about 8000 bilateral effective tax rates.3 The large number of economies
and years covered enables us to apply panel econometric methods to control for
country-pair specific heterogeneity in FDI relations. Specifically, we compare
the impact of unilateral versus bilateral EMTR and EATR in our empirical
analysis. One major finding is that an omission of the country-pair variation in
effective tax rates leads to an underestimation of the role of taxation for FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
1For instance, Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002, p. 452) note: ”Typically, corporate
income taxes ... act as a disincentive to invest. The two aspects of these [rate-cutting and base-
broadening] reforms have offsetting effects on this disincentive: the lower tax rate increases
the incentive to invest, while the lower allowance increases it.”
2For instance, foreign affiliates may finance an investment project at the foreign market
and/or via equity from the parent company.
3Up to now, the most comprehensive comparable studies are Yoo (2003), computing bilat-
eral effective tax rates for the OECD countries and three selected years (1991, 1996 and 2001),
and the Commission of the European Communities (2001), calculating bilateral effective tax
rates for the EU15 and from Canada and the US into the EU15 in the year 1999.
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vides a brief overview of the related empirical literature. Section 3 describes
the data and dissects the variation in bilateral effective tax rates into its ma-
jor components. Section 4 introduces the empirical specification and lays out
the estimation framework. Section 5 presents the results, and the last section
summarizes the key findings.
2 A brief overview on previous empirical research
Most of the previous empirical work on corporate taxation and FDI employs
statutory corporate tax rates or backward-looking average effective tax rates as
contained in firm-level balance-sheet data, mainly for reasons of data availability
(see Hines, 1997, 1999, for comprehensive surveys of this literature).4 While the
former ignore a possible influence of the tax base on FDI (e.g., via depreciation
allowances or first-year investment incentives), the latter do not account for
the forward-looking nature of a firm’s investment decisions and, perhaps more
importantly, the endogeneity of backward-looking tax rates from an empirical
perspective (see Devereux and Griffith, 2002, p. 91).
Only a small number of studies employs forward-looking tax burden mea-
sures. These studies tend to support a significant impact of corporate tax rates
on FDI. Early examples are Slemrod (1990), Papke (1991), Shah and Slem-
rod (1991), Cummins and Hubbard (1995) and Devereux and Freeman (1995).
More recently, Devereux and Griffith (1998) analyze U.S. FDI outflows to three
host economies using host country EATR. Gorter and Parikh (2003) rely on
host country EMTR to assess the role of corporate taxation for FDI flows from
8 EU parent countries into 14 EU host countries. Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´,
and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005) consider EMTR and EATR as published in Dev-
ereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002) to investigate bilateral FDI flows between
11 OECD countries between 1984 and 2000.
The majority of these studies incorporates country-specific (i.e., host and/or
parent) effective tax rates rather than their country-pair-specific counterparts.
Only Devereux and Freeman (1995) form an exception using bilateral cost of
capital data as defined in Devereux and Pearson (1995). From the remaining pa-
pers, one group uses host country effective tax rates only (Papke, 1991; Gorter
and Parikh, 2003; Devereux and Griffith, 1998). A second group includes the
parent and host country rates (Shah and Slemrod, 1991; Cummins and Hub-
bard, 1995). A few papers belonging to the latter group additionally account
4For example, Mutti and Grubert (2004: p. 343) note that ”[A]lthough marginal effective
tax rates [...] are a preferable measure to indicate a firm’s incentive to expand output in a
given location, such rates are not available for [...] many [..] countries ...”
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for the method of international double taxation relief via separate regressions
for credit and exemption countries (Slemrod, 1990; Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´,
and Lahre`che-Re´vil, 2005).5 Although the latter approach introduces bilateral
aspects in the relationship of interest, there remain some significant differences
to Devereux and Freeman (1995). Most importantly, the bilateral tax burden is
not only determined by the method of double taxation relief but also by other
bilaterally negotiated (rather than unilaterally applied) rules of international
taxation, such as the agreed level of withholding taxes on repatriated profits,
and by the additional financing opportunities of multinationals as compared to
national firms. In contrast to Devereux and Freeman (1995), we suggest in-
cluding the parent and host country effective tax rates along with the bilateral
effective tax rates. This allows for a distinction between the direct impact of
bilateral tax rates and the indirect one of unilateral tax rates (affecting mainly
national firms) on the investment decisions of multinational firms.
3 Conceptual framework
3.1 The concept of effective tax rates
The framework to compute (unilateral) EMTR has been developed by King
and Fullerton (1984), and was subsequently applied by the OECD (1991) and
the Commission of the European Community (1992, 2001), among others. The
main idea behind these rates is to calculate the tax wedge between the rate
of return of hypothetical investment projects and a given rate of return on
savings. The tax wedge is determined by statutory tax rates (on retained
and repatriated profits) and the definition of the tax base (e.g., depreciation
allowances, first-year extra allowances or deductability of interest on debt). It
is further influenced by the alternative ways to finance the project (i.e., retained
earnings, new equity, and debt).
Consider a marginal investment whose after-tax rate of return is just equal
to the after-tax rate of return on an alternative asset. The corresponding before-
tax rate of return is known as the cost of capital (see Auerbach, 1979). The tax
wedge is defined as the difference between the cost of capital and the after-tax
rate of return. The EMTR is equal to the ratio of the tax wedge and the cost
of capital. In contrast to the EMTR, the EATR informs about the tax burden
on average (infra-marginal) investment projects, which yield a higher rate of
return than the marginal investment discussed above (see Devereux and Griffith
5Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005) use the difference between the host
and the parent country effective tax rates and introduce dummy variables for exemption and
credit countries.
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1999, 2003). The underlying reasoning is that the decisions to go multinational
(i.e., locating production abroad versus exporting) and where to locate a foreign
subsidiary are discrete in the sense that firms choose the alternative with the
highest after-tax profits. Hence, the net present value of an investment project
with a given economic rent before taxes is compared with the net present value
of the associated costs. This difference, related to the net present value of the
income stream in the absence of taxation, defines the EATR. The EATR is
equal to the EMTR for a marginal investment project, and identical to the
statutory tax rate for investment projects with infinite economic rents. Hence,
the EATR can be expressed as a weighted average between the EMTR and
the statutory tax rate (see Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Devereux, Griffith and
Klemm, 2002). Since FDI figures comprise both marginal (i.e., changing the
existing capital stock abroad) and average investment (i.e., installing new plants
abroad), we use both EMTR and EATR alternatively in our empirical analysis.
The assumption behind the bilateral effective tax rate is that a parent com-
pany undertakes investment through a fully owned foreign subsidiary. The
corresponding profits are immediately and fully repatriated to the parent com-
pany, inducing potential double taxation of profits. Hence, bilateral effective
tax rates incorporate information about alleviation of double taxation as con-
tained in unilateral and bilateral tax law, e.g., methods of double taxation relief
such as credit, exemption, and deduction, or withholding tax rates on repatri-
ated foreign-earned profits. Further, bilateral effective tax rates account for the
fact that a foreign subsidiary has additional alternatives to finance an invest-
ment project as compared to a national firm (see below for further details). We
follow the conceptual framework laid out in Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003)
to compute bilateral, time-variant tax rates (see the Appendix for details on
the tax legislation of the countries and years covered in our analysis).
3.2 Theoretical background for the impact of effective tax rates
on FDI
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we argue that – with coexisting national
(potentially exporting) and multinational enterprises – bilateral multinational
activity as reflected in FDI depends on both home and host country unilateral
effective tax rates but also on bilateral ones. Let us illustrate this argument by
means of the expressions for EMTR derived from three conditions for firm-type-
specific profits in some market j: the one pertaining to firms based in market
i which serve consumers in j via exports (indexed by superscript ei); the one
of multinational firms headquartered in i which serve consumers in market j
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locally (indexed by superscriptmi); and the one referring to domestic producers
of j who serve consumers there locally (indexed by superscript dj).
Before stating the expressions for the EMTR for these firm types, it is
useful to introduce some notation. Let us denote the market (i.e., minimum)
return to capital by r? and the economic rate of depreciation by δ. Both r?
and δ are assumed to be identical across countries. Furthermore, fdi refers to
debt financing of an investment by the firm (headquarters) in market i, f ij are
intra-company loans of the parent company in i to its subsidiary in j, and fnj
indicates financing of an investment of the subsidiary in market j by issuing
new equity. Finally, let us introduce three corporate tax parameters: ti is the
statutory corporate tax rate in country i; ai denotes the net present value of
tax depreciation of an investment in country i; and σji is the additional tax
burden for a multinational firm which repatriates profits from a subsidiary in
country j to parent country i. Notice that σji is a function of the withholding
tax rate on repatriated the profits and, depending on the relevant method of
double-taxation relief, the statutory corporate tax rates in the host and the
parent country.6 Following Devereux and Griffith (1999), the EMTR for the
mentioned three firm types serving consumers in market j are calculated from
the corresponding costs of capital (p˜eij , p˜
mi
j , p˜
dj
j ) in the following way:
7
EMTReij =
p˜eij − r?
p˜eij
; p˜eij =
(r? + δ)(1− ai)
(1− ti) −
fdi (1 + r
?)
(1− ti) − δ
(1)
EMTRmij =
p˜mij − r?
p˜mij
; p˜mij =
(r? + δ)(1− aj)
(1− tj) −
(fdi + f
i
j + f
n
j )(1 + r
?)
(1 + σji)(1− tj) − δ
(2)
EMTRdjj =
p˜
dj
j − r?
p˜
dj
j
; p˜djj =
(r? + δ)(1− aj)
(1− tj) −
fdj (1 + r
?)
(1− tj) − δ.
(3)
6More precisely, σji is defined as (see Devereux and Griffith, 1999, p. 41)
σji =

τji : Exemption
max[(tj − ti)/(1− ti), τji] : Credit (with deferral)
ti(1− τji) + τji : Deduction (with deferral)
where τji is the withholding tax rate on repatriated profits.
7To compute the domestic EMTR, one takes the net present value of investment financed
by retained earnings as the baseline. The income stream from other financing opportunities
(i.e., debt and new equity) is expressed as the difference to this baseline and enters in (1), (2)
and (3) negatively (see Devereux and Griffith, 1999: pp. 18). In the absence of shareholder
taxation (as in our case) the income stream from retained earnings financing is identical to
that from new equity. Hence, we only refer to debt financing here.
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Typically, p˜eij 6= p˜mij will hold since different statutory tax rates and de-
preciation allowances apply to profits on exports as compared to ones on local
sales of a foreign subsidiary so that (1− ai)/(1− ti) 6= (1− aj)/(1− tj). More-
over, the financing opportunities of an investment are different for firms in i
with exports to j from those of multinationals headquartered in i with a sub-
sidiary in j: while for the exporting firm only to debt financing, fdi , matters a
multinational may use debt-financing of a foreign investment through fdi (i.e.,
a parent’s incremental debt to finance the subsidiary), through f ij (i.e., intra-
company loans), and/or through fnj (i.e., the subsidiary’s issuing of new shares).
Finally, a multinational’s foreign profits are treated differently from the ones of
a firm which exports from i to j due to σji which captures double-taxation of
repatriated profits.
Even more importantly, p˜mij 6= p˜djj will typically hold for similar reasons. In
particular, double-taxation (σji) and the respective opportunities to finance the
investment in j are sources of the difference between EMTRmij and EMTR
dj
j .
Hence, even under the exemption system there is typically a difference between
EMTRmij and EMTR
dj
j . Only if double-taxation is absent and under identical
financing opportunities, we would obtain EMTRmij = EMTR
dj
j from (2) and
(3). In our sample, there is not the case for any country-pair.
By construction, there is some overlap between EMTRmij and EMTR
dj
j ,
while there is almost none between EMTRmij and EMTR
ei
j . An increase in tj
will raise both EMTRmij and EMTR
dj
j ceteris paribus. However, EMTR
mi
j can
obviously be affected by σji without altering EMTR
dj
j . From (2) and (3) we
obtain
EMTRmij − EMTRdjj =
p˜mij − p˜djj
p˜mij p˜
dj
j
r? (4)
Hence, using EMTRdjj and EMTR
ei
j along with EMTR
mi
j in an empirical model
to explain multinational activity from i to j is equivalent to using EMTRmij −
EMTRdjj instead of EMTR
mi
j .
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Ultimately, we need to answer why it is important to consider EMTReij ,
EMTRmij , and EMTR
dj
j simultaneously, when analyzing the impact of effective
marginal tax rates on FDI. The answer is that – with coexisting firm types ei,
mi, and dj in market j – profits of mi multinational firms in j depend on those
of the other firms active in that market. The lower EMTReij is, the cheaper it
is ceteris paribus to serve consumers via exports rather than producing locally
8Provided the negligible conceptual overlap between EMTRmij and EMTR
ei
j , we may ignore
the associated difference term with those two EMTR.
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through foreign subsidiaries or domestic firms in market j. The lower EMTRdjj
is, the cheaper it is ceteris paribus to serve consumers via local sales of domestic
firms in j rather than via exports from abroad or via foreign-owned subsidiaries.
Competition among different firm types for consumers in j renders any activity
dependent on the three EMTR together. Similar arguments hold for the corre-
sponding effective average tax rates (EATRs; see Devereux and Griffith, 1999,
for the relation of EMTRs and EATRs).
3.3 Calculation of effective tax rates
Since different types of assets are subject to different tax depreciation allowances
and the returns on investment are taxed differently when paid out as dividends,
interest, or capital gains, we first need assumptions about the types of assets
and about the various ways to finance the investment. Here, we assume that
investment projects consist of three different assets: buildings, machinery, and
inventory. Following Yoo (2003), we allow for three sources of financing –
retained earnings, new equity, and debt – when computing the unilateral ef-
fective tax rates, and for seven alternatives for financing a foreign subsidiary
which matters for calculating the bilateral effective tax rates.9 In sum, we ob-
tain 9 combinations between investment projects and financing opportunities
for domestic firms and, hence, unilateral effective tax rates. In contrast, there
are 21 such combinations for foreign subsidiaries, entering bilateral effective tax
rates. To calculate average EMTR and EATR we use the following weights (see
OECD, 1991; Yoo, 2003): both parent companies as well as foreign subsidiaries
are assumed to be financed at 55 percent by retained earnings, at 35 percent
by debt, and at 10 percent by new equity; 28 percent of the average investment
is in buildings, 50 percent in machinery, and 22 percent in inventories.
The required minimum pre-tax rate of return, r?, is 5 percent. With EATR
we assume an economic rent of 20 percent (as in Devereux and Griffith, 1999,
2003). In line with the OECD (1991), economic depreciation, δ, is set at 3.61
percent for buildings, at 12.25 percent for machinery, and at zero for inventory.
The inflation rate is 2.5 percent and the real exchange rate is held constant
throughout. r?, δ, the inflation rate, and the exchange rate are identical for all
countries.
We use information from national tax codes about the following tax vari-
ables: statutory corporate tax rates including local profit taxes, rates of
9Of the nine possible combinations of retained earnings, new equity, and debt used by the
parent and the subsidiary, we exclude the cases where the investment is financed via retained
earnings by the subsidiary and via debt or new equity by the parent company. Further, debt
financing of the subsidiary may only take the form of intra-company loans from the parent.
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tax depreciation (the number of years for which depreciation allowances can
be claimed), the allowance schemes (straight line and declining balance as
well as combinations thereof), and the valuation of inventories (LIFO, FIFO,
and weighted average). In the presence of alternative depreciation allowance
schemes, we use the most generous one.10 From the allowance schemes and the
rates of depreciation, we derive a net present value of depreciation allowances
(Yoo, 2003, p: 41, provides the corresponding formulas; see also King and
Fullerton, 1984). Withholding tax rates on repatriated profits of foreign-owned
subsidiaries (assuming qualified ownership of the foreign entity) are taken from
national tax codes and bilateral tax treaties. Information about the applied
method of double taxation relief (exemption, credit, or deduction) is available
from bilateral tax treaties and the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive (stipulating
zero withholding tax rates), and is used whenever international tax law has
primacy over domestic tax law. Notice that we do not account for the share-
holder and, therefore, abstract from personal income taxation at this level (i.e.,
dividend and capital gains taxation) for the sake of transparency. For the same
reason, we also abstract from property taxation, here. Further information on
the sources of unilateral and bilateral tax law is provided in the Appendix.
3.4 Dissecting bilateral effective tax rates
Let us start with a descriptive analysis of the bilateral effective tax rates as
compared to their unilateral counterparts. To describe the distribution of ef-
fective tax rates, we use box plots. Bold lines within the boxes represent the
median, whereas the boundaries of the boxes indicate the two quartiles at the
center of the distribution (i.e., the interquartile range). The whiskers in the
plots have a length of 1.5 times the interquartile range. Entries outside the
whiskers refer to observations in the upper or lower tails of the distribution.
Figures 1 and 2 display the box plots for the unilateral, time-variant,
forward-looking effective tax rates.11 We observe a downward trend in effective
tax rates. The medians of the EATR are in the range of 25 to 32 percent,
whereas the ones of the EMTR are lower, as expected. In case of the EMTR,
10In some cases, tax law allows a change from the declining balance to the straight line
system. Typically, the tax law defines a specific point in time for this switch. Otherwise,
we assume that the switch takes place as soon as the value of the straight line depreciation
exceeds the one of the declining balance (see also Devereux and Griffith, 1999).
11To save space, we display unilateral EATR and EMTR for host countries only. In a
balanced panel, the moments of the unilateral host-specific rates would be identical to the
parent-specific ones. Since our panel data-set is unbalanced, the moments for the parent
countries deviate from their host country counterparts. However, this difference is rather
small.
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we obtain even negative entries in the first three years of the sample period.12
> Figures 1 and 2 <
Bilateral effective tax rates are displayed in Figures 3 and 4. Similar to the
unilateral ones, they tend to decrease over the sample period. The medians of
the bilateral effective tax rates are higher and their spread is wider than for
the unilateral ones, especially for the EMTR. Apart from domestic tax law,
the bilateral effective tax rates depend on various details of taxation as laid
out in bilateral tax treaties (such as double taxation relief and withholding
taxes) and on the financing opportunities of multinational firms. Further, the
time variation seems to be small but sufficient for fixed country-pair effects
estimation (to see this, consider the fluctuations in the upper and lower bounds
of the whiskers).13
> Figures 3 and 4 <
To illustrate the importance of bilateral tax rates, Figures 5 and 6 focus
on the difference between the bilateral effective tax rates and the unilateral
ones. Roughly, this difference can be interpreted as the additional tax burden
for profits of foreign affiliates as compared to the ones of national firms as in
equation (4). It represents the change in the effective tax rate, if a country-j -
owned domestic firm becomes an affiliate of a country-i -based multinational. It
is obvious from the figures that foreign affiliates pay higher taxes (in terms of
EATR and EMTR) than their domestic counterparts, reflecting an additional
tax burden for multinational firms (e.g., due to withholding taxes on repatriated
profits). The median of the additional tax burden of a multinational firm is
around 7 percent for EATR and around 9 percent for EMTR, and it declines
during the observation period.
12The negative outliers are Austria (1991, 1992, 1993), Belgium (1991) and Ireland (1991).
With Austria, a 20 percent extra first-year allowance is responsible for the negative values
in 1991, 1992 and 1993. With Belgium, the negative EMTR is due to a 1 percent plus
inflation extra first-year allowance in combination with generous declining balance deprecation
allowances and a high statutory corporate tax rate. The negative entry in Ireland is due to a
50 percent immediate depreciation allowance (abolished in 1992).
13The cross-country dimension of the sample changes over the years (notably in 1996)
with new countries entering the OECD. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we exploit only
variation within country-pairs. Hence, an increase in the number of country-pairs as such is
irrelevant for the parameter estimates.
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> Figures 5 and 6 <
The quantitative importance of different dimensions of variation in bilateral
effective tax rates can be investigated by means of an analysis of variance. In
this regard, the following questions seem to be interesting. First, how important
is the country-pair-specific variation as compared to the parent and the host
country-specific ones. Second, for fixed effects (within) estimation it is relevant
how important the country-pair variation in tax rates is as compared to the
time-specific variation in the data. Third, how important are the combined
idiosyncratic (country-pair-time-specific) and country-pair-specific variations as
a measure of the difference in variation between the bilateral tax rates and the
unilateral ones. Table 1 summarizes the corresponding findings for both the
bilateral effective average tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate, covering
exactly the same number of observations that will be used to estimate the
effect of corporate taxation on FDI, below. The three subscripts with bilateral
effective tax rates (FDI parent country i; FDI host country j; time period, t)
are associated with a three-dimensional space of variation.
To simplify the notation in the empirical analysis and to avoid superscripts,
we refer to effective tax rates of an exporter in parent country i and year t as
EATRit and EMTRit rather than as EATReijt and EMTR
ei
jt. Accordingly, we
refer to the bilateral tax rates of an i-based MNE with a plant in j in year t as
EATRijt and EMTRijt rather than as EATRmijt and EMTR
mi
jt . Finally, we
use EATRjt and EMTRjt instead of EATR
dj
jt and EMTR
dj
jt , respectively.
> Table 1 <
In Table 1, the total variance in effective tax rates is split into two major
components: the one explained by a set of dummy variables (i.e., the ’model’)
and the rest (the ’residual’). Here, we are only interested in dissecting the two
bilateral effective tax rates. Accordingly, there are no covariates included so
that the model and residual variances sum up to the total variance of the tax
rates. The model variance is made up of three ’main’ effects (parent coun-
try, host country, and time) and a comprehensive set of three pairwise inter-
action effects (parent country×host country, parent country×time, and host
country×time). It is important to emphasize that the main effects are nested
in the interaction effects. Hence, the space of the three main effects is included
in the one spanned by the interaction effects. This implies that there are re-
strictions on the parameters. The main effects sum up to zero, but also the
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sum over all interaction effects is restricted to zero.14 In less formal accounts:
after dropping the main effects, the inclusion of the interactive effects without
restrictions would still lead to the same model and residual variances.
The first two columns of Table 1 reflect the variance in absolute and in
relative terms. The latter is the variance due to each effect in percent of the
total variance. The overall set of dummy variables (including the constant,
which is not reported) accounts for 98.13 (97.56) percent of the variation in
the EATRijt (EMTRijt). The third column of results summarizes the degrees
of freedom corresponding to each effect, i.e., the number of dummy variables
reflecting parent countries, host countries, years, or interactions thereof in the
sample. The last column reports the mean squared errors.
The second column of the table indicates which dimension of the panel ac-
tually accounts for the lion’s share in the variation of tax rates. Obviously,
this is the host country dimension for both EATRijt and EMTRijt. Hence, a
major component of bilateral tax rates is due to time-invariant, host-country-
specific differences in tax law. However, almost 12 percent of the variance is
country-pair-specific and time-invariant. Altogether, the time-invariant vari-
ance components (constant, parent country, host country, and country-pair)
account for about 90 percent of the total variation in effective tax rates (of this,
more than 70 percentage points are contributed by the time-invariant devia-
tions from the overall mean). Hence, a panel econometric analysis with fixed
country-pair effects may exploit about 10 percent (=2.37+0.91+4.47+1.87) of
the variation in EATR. In the case of EMTR, about 16 percent of the variation
is left. If fixed time effects are included as well, another 2 percentage points of
the variation are wiped out. However, in a large data-set as ours the tax rate
effects on FDI should still be easily identifiable.
4 Empirical analysis
Specification and econometric issues: In the subsequent analysis, we fo-
cus on the impact of effective corporate tax burden on outbound FDI. In a
basic version of the model we employ a gravity specification of bilateral out-
bound FDI, where we include forward-looking effective tax rates (EMTR and
EATR). The gravity model typically includes parent and host country GDP as
well as GDP per capita (see Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Mutti and Grubert,
2004; Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil, 2005, for the use of grav-
14This guarantees that the mean of the model is equal to the overall mean.
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ity models in the analysis of corporate tax issues on FDI).15 Following recent
research (see Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil, 2005; Blonigen,
Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2007), we account for the host country market
potential – i.e., inverse distance-weighted real GDP of all third markets – to
account for export-platform motives of FDI.16 We use real GDP and real GDP
per capita in U.S. dollars with 2000 as the base year from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators 2005.
All of our empirical models rely on fixed country-pair and fixed time effects
estimation. Hence, any potentially important time-invariant determinants such
as bilateral distance, common language, adjacency, but also time-invariant po-
litical and institutional factors are comprehensively captured by the fixed ef-
fects. The estimated specifications based on unilateral forward looking effective
tax rates are
FDIijt = α1τi,t−1 + α2τj,t−1 + β1GDPit + β2GDPjt
+ β3GDPPCit + β4GDPPCjt + β5MPjt + µij + λt + νijt, (5)
where τ ∈ {EATR,EMTR}. FDIijt denotes the logarithm of bilateral out-
bound stocks of FDI of parent country i in host country j and year t.17
EATRi,t−1 and EATRj,t−1 (EMTRi,t−1 and EMTRj,t−1) are effective tax
rates of the parent and the host country, respectively. We treat these variables
as predetermined and use their lagged values to avoid a possible endogeneity
bias. GDPit and GDPPCit denote parent country log real GDP and log real
GDP per capita. A similar indexation applies for the corresponding host coun-
try variables. MPjt is the inverse-distance weighted average size of all third
markets for host country j and year t. µij are fixed country-pair effects, cap-
turing all unobserved time-invariant influences on outward FDI. λt denote fixed
time effects, reflecting time-specific shocks common to all country-pairs in the
sample. νijt is a remainder error term. The latter may be autocorrelated and/or
heteroskedastic.
15Other representative studies employing gravity equations of FDI are Hufbauer, Lak-
dawalla, and Malani (1994), Eaton and Tamura (1994), Wei (1998), Levy Yeyati, Stein and
Daude (2003), and Braga Nonnenberg and Cardoso de Mendonca (2004). If FDI is mostly
market-seeking, we would expect host country market size to exert a positive impact. If it
is mostly low-cost seeking, we would expect a country’s outbound FDI to decrease in a host
country’s per-capita income (as a measure of factor costs).
16The literature on multinational firms speaks of export-platform FDI as one that is con-
ducted primarily to serve third markets apart from the host market itself (see Baltagi, Egger,
and Pfaffermayr, 2007, 2008; Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007). We would expect host
countries with large and close-by third markets to attract a lot of export-platform FDI.
17Recently, Mutti and Grubert (2004) indicate that a specification of FDI in logs is preferable
over one in levels.
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The corresponding empirical models employing bilateral effective tax rates
are
FDIijt = α1τi,t−1 + α2τj,t−1 + α3τij,t−1 + β1GDPit
+ β2GDPjt + β3GDPPCit + β4GDPPCjt
+ β5MPjt + µij + λt + νijt (6)
where EATRij,t−1 (EMTRij,t−1) is included to take into account that par-
ent country i’s multinationals are directly affected by the bilateral tax rate
rather than by the unilateral host and parent country tax rates only. In ac-
cordance with Devereux and Freeman (1995), we expect a negative coefficient
of the bilateral tax rate for multinationals of country i operating subsidiaries
in j. A higher bilateral tax rate discourages country i’s FDI in j and creates
an incentive to serve this market via exports, for example. However, in con-
trast to Devereux and Freeman (1995) but in line with our reasoning in the
previous section, the unilateral parent and host country tax rates EATRi,t−1
and EATRj,t−1 (EMTRi,t−1 and EMTRj,t−1) are additionally included in the
model. The parent’s unilateral tax rate accounts for the corporate tax environ-
ment of national firms (exporters) at the domestic market. Intuitively, a higher
effective tax rate in country i increases the tax burden of national firms. Then,
it is more attractive for these firms to shift (parts of) their production abroad
and go multinational. Hence, we predict a positive relationship between the
domestic effective tax rates and outbound FDI. Similarly, the host’s unilateral
effective tax rate captures the tax environment for national firms there. We
would expect this variable to enter positively, exerting an indirect impact on
multinational firms headquartered in i and investing in j. The higher the effec-
tive tax rate of national firms in j – holding constant the bilateral tax rate of
foreign affiliates in j – the more FDI we would expect firms from i to conduct
in this country.18
The FDI data contain numerous missing values (accordingly, our sample re-
duces from about 8000 possible bilateral effective tax rate data points to 2361
observations in Table 2). These could be randomly missing but there could also
be systematic variation, resulting in a sample selection bias (see Razin, Rubin-
stein, and Sadka, 2005, for an application of a cross-sectional sample selection
model in international taxation). We apply a test on sample selection with a
18While there is some correlation between the bilateral and the unilateral host country tax
rate, the two rates are sufficiently independent to identify their impact separately. In our
sample, the correlation coefficient between EMTRij and EMTRj (EATRij and EATRj) is
estimated at 0.77 (0.80) in the average year (see Table A2). This is sufficient for identification,
given the large number of observations.
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fixed effects panel data estimator (Wooldridge, 1995). This entails estimating
a (binary choice; in our case, a probit) sample selection model for each year
separately. The dependent variable in this model is an indicator taking the
value 0 whenever bilateral FDI is missing in a given year and 1 else. We employ
a gravity model using parent and host country GDP, GDP per capita, market
potential, and bilateral distance in the selection equation.19 Based on the vec-
tor of estimated model predictions in the selection equation, we can compute
the Mills’ ratio for all years to control for the selection bias in the FDI model.
Identification is based on two sources: the year-specific estimation and the non-
linear functional form of the selection probability model. The coefficient of
the Mills’ ratios in Tables 2 and 3 is significant in all models, indicating that
there is systematic selection into the sample. Ignoring this endogenous selection
could lead to biased parameter estimates. Consequently, we follow Wooldridge
(1995) in applying the selection correction with panel data. This is based on
a Mundlak-type approach which includes the group means of all explanatory
variables as additional regressors instead of the country-pair dummy variables.
In this way, one obtains the same within parameters as with the least-squares
dummy variable estimator. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the pa-
rameters of the group means of the explanatory variables. A test on their joint
significance indicates whether a simple pooled OLS model is rejected against
the Wooldridge-type fixed effects estimator (the test statistic is given at the
bottom of Table 2 and is significant throughout). The estimation of the stan-
dard errors of the parameters has to take into account that the Mills’ ratio itself
is estimated in the first stage.
Estimation results: The regression results for specifications (5) and (6) are
summarized in Table 2. (5) is represented by ”Model 1” and ”Model 3”, and
(6) is labeled ”Model 2” and ”Model 4”.
> Table 2 <
Generally, the estimated models in Table 2 seem well specified. Especially,
the control variables take the expected signs: Market potential enters positively,
suggesting the importance of platform FDI. With regard to the home and host
19Hence, we assume that FDI data are more likely missing if parent and host countries
are small, exhibit a low GDP per capita, and are distant from each other. This is strongly
confirmed by the estimation results of the selection models (detailed model output is available
from the authors upon request but suppressed here for the sake of brevity).
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country GDPs we should be careful when interpreting the corresponding pa-
rameter estimates. For instance, taking the derivative of log FDI with respect
to host country GDP reveals that the overall marginal effect depends on GDP
and GDP per capita, and is positive overall.
In all models, we account for the parent and host country unilateral tax rates
(EATRi,t−1, EATRj,t−1, and EMTRi,t−1, EMTRj,t−1, respectively). When
excluding bilateral effective tax rates from the specification, a higher parent
country unilateral tax rate stimulates outbound FDI, whereas a higher host
country unilateral tax rate impedes it, although insignificantly so (see Models
1 and 3 in Table 2). This result is in line with recent research focusing on the
impact of unilateral effective tax rates on bilateral FDI.20 However, this model
maintains that all domestic and multinational firms in the host country pay the
same tax rate and ignores bilateral variation in the tax burden. This is at odds
with the intuition that higher effective tax rates for national firms in the host
country should increase outbound FDI into this economy.
The estimated impact of the host country unilateral tax rate changes sub-
stantially, if we include the bilateral tax rate in addition to the unilateral ones
(see Models 2 and 4 in Table 2). As said before, the impact of the host coun-
try unilateral tax rate then captures the taxation environment there, given the
bilateral tax rate for multinationals of parent i. In accordance with our expecta-
tion discussed above, the sign of the parameter estimate is now positive. Hence,
there are two dimensions of host country taxation. We should distinguish an
increase in the tax rate affecting national firms, exhibiting an indirect positive
effect on bilateral FDI, from an increase of a parent country’s bilateral tax rate
with the same host, exerting a direct negative effect on bilateral FDI. Omitting
the bilateral tax rate from the specification results in a bias of the absolute
impact of corporate taxation on bilateral FDI. In particular, the relevance of
the bilateral dimension of taxation is not acknowledged appropriately in this
case.
In Table 3, we estimate specifications which are based on the Markusen’s
(2002) knowledge-capital model of the multinational enterprise rather than a
gravity model. The knowledge-capital model emphasizes the role of skilled labor
endowments for multinational activity. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and
Markusen and Maskus (2002) propose an empirical model which includes total
bilateral market size, log(GDPit+GDPjt), the squared difference in parent and
20For instance, Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005) investigate the impact
of the tax rate differential between host and parent countries on FDI inflows. They find a
significantly negative impact of this tax difference. This is consistent with the finding of a
negative (positive) impact of the host (parent) country tax rate.
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host market size, (log(GDPit/GDPjt))2, and four interaction terms which in-
volve parent and host country skill endowment variables.21 For the introduction
of these interaction terms, it is useful to define the dummy variables D(SKit >
SKjt) and D(SKit < SKjt) which are set to one if the condition in parentheses
holds zero else (SKit and SKjt indicate the parent and host country’s skilled
labor endowments). Furthermore, let us refer to the logarithm of bilateral dis-
tance between countries i and j by log(Distij). The four interaction terms are:
(SKit−SKjt) log(GDPit/GDPjt)2D(SKit > SKjt), (SKit−SKjt) log(GDPit+
GDPjt)D(SKit > SKjt), −(SKit−SKjt) log(GDPit+GDPjt)D(SKit < SKjt),
(SKit − SKjt)2 log(Distij). A negative sign of the parameters for the first
three interaction terms would indicate a dominance of market-seeking (hori-
zontal) multinational activity. A positive sign of the parameter for the second
term and a negative one for the last one would indicate a dominance of low-
production-cost-seeking (vertical) multinational activity (see Markusen, 2002).
With this specification and unilateral effective tax rates only, the estimated
empirical model reads
FDIijt = α1τi,t−1 + α2τj,t−1
+ β1 log(GDPit +GDPjt) + β2(log(GDPit/GDPjt))2
+ β3(SKit − SKjt) log(GDPit/GDPjt)2D(SKit > SKjt)
+ β4(SKit − SKjt) log(GDPit +GDPjt)D(SKit > SKjt)
+ β5(−(SKit − SKjt) log(GDPit +GDPjt)D(SKit < SKjt))
+ β6(SKit − SKjt)2 log(Distij) + µij + λt + νijt, (7)
where τ ∈ {EATR,EMTR}. As in the gravity model, we estimate a second
specification where the bilateral effective tax rate, τij,t−1, enters additionally in
(7). The unilateral specifications are indicated by ”Model 5” and ”Model 7”,
and the bilateral ones are labeled ”Model 6” and ”Model 8”. The estimation
results for the knowledge-capital model are presented in Table 3.
> Table 3 <
In the data at hand, there is no clear-cut implicit evidence for the dominance
of horizontal multinational activity as compared to vertical activity. Moreover,
21As before, GDP is measured in real terms. Skilled labor endowments are approximated
by the fraction of technicians as available from the International Labor Organization (ILO)
and also used in the studies of Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus
(2002).
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while the knowledge-capital model specification is superior to the gravity model
when considering effective marginal tax rates the reverse is true for effective
average tax rates (compare the corresponding model R2 in Tables 2 and 3).
However, the conclusions derived from including bilateral effective tax rates
along with unilateral ones in are similar for both types of models: the parameter
of the host country unilateral effective tax rate turns significantly positive only
after including the bilateral effective tax rate.
We may summarize our findings in the following way. There is a positive
impact of unilateral effective tax rates given bilateral tax rates and a direct
negative impact of bilateral effective tax rates given unilateral ones. The latter
effect is consistent with Devereux and Freeman (1995), who find that bilateral
costs of capital are negatively related to flows of outbound FDI.
Robustness: We assess the sensitivity of the results in various ways. How-
ever, provided the similar conclusions from the specifications in Tables 2 and 3,
we focus on three modifications of the gravity model in Table 2 for the sake of
brevity. In order to facilitate the comparison of the estimation results, we use
the same Probit specification for sample selection throughout. We only report
the parameters of the tax variables of interest. The model numbers indicate
which baseline specification in Table 2 the parameters should be compared to.
> Table 4 <
Letters ’a’ to ’c’ with the model labels refer to the corresponding robustness
experiment. ’a’ indicates models that exclude the (low-tax) transition countries
from the estimation (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). This is motivated
by the conjecture that our previous results could be driven by the low tax
rates in Central and Eastern Europe. However, it turns out that the pattern of
changes from a unilateral specification to a bilateral one is qualitatively similar
to the results in Table 2.
’b’ labels a specification that excludes all non-European economies from
the sample (both as parent and as host countries). This leads to a dramatic
decline in the number of observations from originally 2361 to 1489. The reason
is that especially the U.S. and also Japan are among the most important parent
and host countries in the world but they are now excluded from the sample.
Therefore, not all of the tax parameters of interest can be estimated at the same
level of significance as before. However, the qualitative change in the parameter
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point estimates due to the inclusion of the bilateral effect tax rate is similar to
the original outcome.
Finally, in all models with label ’c’ we apply a dynamic model instead of
the static ones in Table 2. This specification can be justified by the presump-
tion that firms might be unable to adjust their location decisions immediately
after a shock (see Devereux and Freeman, 1995, for a discussion). To avoid an
endogeneity bias inherently present in dynamic panels with fixed effects (see,
e.g., Baltagi, 2005, p. 136), we use a GMM-estimator as proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). The estimates of the lagged dependent variable are rather
low and only weakly significant (see the notes in Table 4). The results con-
cerning the signs of the tax variables of interest are unchanged. However, the
Wooldridge-type sample selection correction is not applicable here. Therefore,
the results should be interpreted with care and are not directly comparable to
the original ones in Table 2.
Overall, we conclude that our finding of the importance of the bilateral
dimension in tax rates for bilateral FDI is robust. Empirical work should infer
the role of corporate taxation for FDI based on unilateral and bilateral tax rates
together for the sake of consistent inference.
5 Conclusions
This paper suggests using bilateral effective tax rates in addition to unilateral
ones when assessing the impact of corporate taxation on foreign direct invest-
ment. We follow Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) in computing effective
(average and marginal) tax rates at the bilateral level. Screening national tax
codes and all tax treaties in place among the OECD economies, we construct a
panel of unilateral and bilateral effective tax rates among the OECD economies
for a time span reaching from 1991 to 2002.
Our findings suggest that unilateral tax rates significantly affect the pro-
duction and location decisions of multinational firms. This result is in line
with most of the previous empirical studies. However, our specific focus on the
country-pair-specific tax burden motivates some additional conclusions. The
parameter of bilateral tax rates captures the direct impact on bilateral FDI,
given the tax rates for national firms. The parameters of the unilateral parent
and host country tax rates reflect the indirect impact through their role for na-
tional firms a given parent and host country, respectively. Relying on unilateral
effective tax rates only may result in misleading conclusions about the impact
of a change in bilateral tax instruments (e.g., through bilateral tax treaties)
on bilateral FDI. In particular, an increase in host country unilateral tax rates
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that affect national firms is erroneously associated with a decline in FDI there
with our data at hand. When controlling for unilateral and bilateral effective
tax rates simultaneously, we find a robust negative coefficient of the bilateral
tax burden and a robust positive one of both the unilateral parent and the
unilateral host country tax burden. The latter is consistent with general equi-
librium models where bilateral tax rates affect FDI directly but unilateral ones
affect it indirectly (and positively) through their negative impact on national,
competing enterprises.
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Appendix: Data and descriptive statistics
1. Data on foreign direct investment: We use bilateral outbound FDI stock data as
published by UNCTAD (FDI Country profiles), covering the period 1991-2002.
Parent country coverage: The sample includes 22 OECD parent economies: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ice-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Host country coverage: We have 26 host countries in the sample: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
2. GDP and GDP per capita: Data on real GDP and GDP per capita at constant
U.S. dollars (base year is 2000) are collected from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators 2005. Skill labor endowments are available for the ILO database.
3. Tax rates, depreciation allowances, tax treaties: Information on tax codes (i.e.,
statutory corporate tax rates including local business taxes, withholding taxes on repa-
triated profits, depreciation allowances, first-year extra allowances) and bilateral tax
treaties (i.e., methods of double taxation relief, withholding taxes) are primarily taken
from the following online databases of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documenta-
tion (IBFD):
• Central/Eastern Europe - Taxation & Investment
• Corporate Taxation in Europe
• Tax News Service
• Tax Treaties Database
Further, we exploit information of tax legislation from the following publications:
• Baker&McKenzie, 1999. Survey of the effective tax burden in the European Union,
Amsterdam.
• Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Report of the committee of
independent experts on company taxation, Brussels and Luxembourg.
• Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an internal market
without tax obstacles. A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated
corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM (2001) 582 final, Brussels.
• Ernst&Young, 2003. Company taxation in the new EU Member states survey of
the tax regimes and effective tax burdens for multinational investors, Frankfurt
am Main.
• OECD, 1991. Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International
Issues, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999. Spectre: Study of potential of effective corporate
tax rates in Europe, Report commissioned by the Ministry of Finance in the
Netherlands, Amsterdam.
• Yoo, K.-Y., 2003. Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment income 1991-
2001, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 365, Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development.
4. Descriptive statistics: Table A1, Table A2
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